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Abstract. In this paper we describe a variant of existing meet-in-the-
middle attacks on block ciphers. As an application, we propose meet-
in-the-middle attacks that are applicable to the KTANTAN family of
block ciphers accepting a key of 80 bits. The attacks are due to some
weaknesses in its bitwise key schedule1. We report an attack of time
complexity 275.170 encryptions on the full KTANTAN32 cipher with only
3 plaintext/ciphertext pairs and well as 275.044 encryptions on the full
KTANTAN48 and 275.584 encryptions on the full KTANTAN64 with 2
plaintext/ciphertext pairs. All these attacks work in the classical attack
model without any related keys.
In the diﬀerential related-key model, we demonstrate 218- and 174-
round diﬀerentials holding with probability 1. This shows that a strong
related-key property can translate to a successful attack in the non-
related-key setting. Having extremely low data requirements, these at-
tacks are valid even in RFID-like environments where only a very limited
amount of text material may be available to an attacker.
Keywords: cryptanalysis, meet-in-the-middle attacks, block cipher, key
schedule, lightweight cipher, key-recovery, RFID.
1 Introduction
A number of new cipher designs have been proposed recently, targeting use cases
with severe implementation constraints imposed. Block cipher design methods
have advanced to a stage where strong arguments for the resistance of the design
against large classes of attacks such as diﬀerential and linear cryptanalysis are
possible. However, if aggressive design decisions have been made forced by a
restrictive application scenario, some other, more dedicated analysis techniques
may turn out useful for attacking the cipher.
Cryptographic techniques move into applications like sensor nodes, RFID tags,
or the “the Internet of things” at large. The ever increasing demand for security
1 The SAC 2010 pre-proceedings version of this paper [6] was based on a key-schedule
from a previous version of the reference code which contained errors. This paper is
based on the corrected reference code available under [1].
A. Biryukov, G. Gong, and D.R. Stinson (Eds.): SAC 2010, LNCS 6544, pp. 229–240, 2011.
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and privacy in these very constrained environments requires new cryptographic
primitives, like tiny yet eﬃcient ciphers. A number of designs and implementa-
tion techniques have been proposed recently to address this need. Stream ciphers
like Trivium [10,8], Grain [17,18], or Mickey [3], or block ciphers like DESL [22],
PRESENT [4], HIGHT [19], mCrypton [23], KATAN and KTANTAN [9], or the
hash functions based on PRESENT [5] are among the important ones.
Motivation. The economical and physical constraints force designers to make
design decisions which are often considered to be “on the edge”. In this con-
text it is often argued that block ciphers are better understood than stream
ciphers and are hence more trustworthy. Some recent designs like PRESENT
and KATAN/KTANTAN have come with strong arguments that large classes
of attacks shown powerful in the past are not applicable. The technique used is
to provide bounds on various non-random properties, like diﬀerential or linear
characteristics. Indeed, whereas in the eStream project a number of lightweight
stream ciphers were broken, sometimes even with practical attack complexities,
none of the recently proposed block ciphers have been broken so far.
KTANTAN [9] accepts a key of 80 bits. It was designed to resist diﬀerential
and linear attacks, and exhibits strong bounds in the non-related-key model,
an upper bound 2−b on the probability of every diﬀerential/linear characteristic
over 128 rounds being an essential design criterion (b ∈ {32, 48, 64} is the block
size of the cipher). Even if related keys are considered, a much less realistic
setting, designers report no diﬀerential characteristic with a higher probability
than 2−b for 150 out of the 254 rounds. In [2], Albrecht et al. study algebraic
approaches to amplify diﬀerential attacks on this family of ciphers.
Contributions and Outline. Section 2 considers a framework for MITM at-
tacks. In Section 4, based on this framework, we propose a key-recovery attack
on the KTANTAN block cipher family (brieﬂy described in Section 3), requiring
only very few known plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Hence this kind of attacks is
even valid in very restrictive RFID-like environments and protocols where only
a very limited number of transactions are foreseen in the lifetime of a tag. The
parameters and complexities of our attacks are provided in Table 1. Some prop-
erties we use translate to probability-1 related-key diﬀerentials over many rounds
which are outlined in Table 4. Note that the data complexity of our attacks is
Table 1. Results on MITM cryptanalysis for KTANTAN
attack/bound cipher #rounds time data compl.
b ∈ {32, 48, 64} (of 254) [encryptions] [PT/CT pars]
[9], RK diﬀ. bound KTANTANb 150 O(2b) O(2b)
[9], DC and LC bound KTANTANb 128 O(2b) O(2b)
this paper, MITM attack KTANTAN32 254 275.170 3
this paper, MITM attack KTANTAN48 254 275.044 2
this paper, MITM attack KTANTAN64 254 275.584 2
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the lowest possible and exactly corresponds to that of a brute-force attack. We
conclude with a discussion on links to other works, high-level design choices for
low-resource ciphers, and future work in Section 5.
2 Framework for MITM Attacks
2.1 Basic MITM Attack
The basic meet-in-the-middle (MITM) approach will be a starting point for our
attack. MITM techniques are arguably much less common than diﬀerential or
linear attacks on ciphers. There are some applications of MITM principles to
block ciphers like DES or AES, see e.g. [7,11,12,14,15,20] for dedicated attacks,
and e.g. [24,25] for meet-in-the-middle attacks on a higher level.
The basic MITM technique is due to Diﬃe and Hellman [13]. Let ϕi,j denote
the partial transform of an R-round block cipher beginning in round i and ending
directly after round j under some ﬁxed key, 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ R, see Figure 1. Then
if ϕ1,α and ϕα+1,R use subkeys with distinct key bits, the key can be as a
rule recovered much more eﬃciently than by brute force over two subkeys. The
central idea here, as also applied to reduced DES in [15], is that the subkeys
in both parts of the cipher can be guessed independently. Each guess of the
ﬁrst subkey allows the adversary to compute ϕ1,α(p) and of the second subkey
to obtain ϕ−1α+1,R(c). The right key will be among those fulﬁlling the equation
ϕ1,α(p) = ϕ−1α+1,R(c).
2.2 The 3-Subset MITM Approach
Here we consider a variant of the basic MITM attack. The idea is to remove
restrictions on the choice of key bits, thereby potentially allowing attacks where
an attack is not possible with the basic MITM approach. Instead of considering
two subsets of key bits, we consider three subsets. The attack consists of two
parts. In the MITM stage, we ﬁlter out some wrong key candidates and reduce
the key space. In the key testing stage, we look for the right key in the reduced
key space.
Let K = k−1k−2 . . . k1k0 be the -bit key. Then if K1 = {ki : ki used by ϕ1,α}











1 Rα R − β + 1
Fig. 1. MITM
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bits used both by the ﬁrst α and last β rounds, see Figure 1. Moreover, A1 =
K1\K1∩K2 and A2 = K2\K1∩K2 are the sets of key bits used by K1 only and
by K2 only, respectively. We further assume that K1 ∪K2 = K.
For the attack we need n plaintext/ciphertext pairs {(xi, yi)}, i = 1, . . . , n.
Let xi be plaintext and yi ciphertext.
MITM Stage. The meet-in-the-middle part of the attack on R rounds of the
cipher can be performed as follows:
– For each guess of key bits in A0:
• For each guess of key bits in A1:
∗ Compute v = ϕ1,α(x)
• For each guess of key bits in A2:
∗ Compute u = ϕ−1R−β+1,R(y)• Perform matching in the middle between the values of v and the values
of u on m bits, 1 ≤ m ≤ b (see Subsection 4.3) and add surviving
key candidates to the list K of surviving keys. We expect to have false
positives with probability 2−m which is called the false positive rate of
a MITM attack.
Key Testing Stage. In this stage, we test the surviving key candidates from K
using some plaintext-ciphertext pairs in a brute-force manner. Generally speak-
ing, it is not necessary to use additional plaintext-ciphertext pairs. The number
of the texts needed is deﬁned by the unicity distance of the cipher which essen-
tially depends on the block size and key length. If we can signiﬁcantly reduce
the key space in the MITM stage (by ruling out a large part of the keys), the
complexity of the key testing stage will be negligible with respect to the MITM
stage. Generally speaking, however, this is not necessarily the case.
Attack Complexity. The computational complexity of the attack will be dom-
inated by
Ccomp = 2|A0|(2|A1| + 2|A2|)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
MITM stage




If A1 and A2 are both non-empty and |A1|+ |A2| > 2, then the attack becomes
more eﬃcient than exhaustive search provided that the false positive rate is low
enough.
The MITM stage requires exactly one plaintext/ciphertext pair. However, of
the b bits only m are used for matching. That is, the information contained in
the other b − m state bits is not used in this stage and can be used in the key
testing stage. For the key testing stage, more pairs might be required, depending







depending on the block size b and the key length . The memory complexity is
deﬁned by matching in the MITM stage. For small sets A1 and A2, it is negligible.
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3 A Short Description of KTANTAN
KTANTAN is a block cipher which accepts an 80-bit user-supplied key. Versions
with block size b ∈ {32, 48, 64} bit have been speciﬁed. Each version has 254
rounds. While the deﬁnition of a round transform diﬀers from version to ver-
sion, the key schedule remains the same. Throughout the paper, we refer to the
KTANTAN version with b-bit blocks as KTANTANb.
3.1 Round Transform
KATAN and KTANTAN share the speciﬁcation of a round transform, as the
operations on the state are exactly the same up to the key schedule. The state
of the cipher is represented as two disjunct parts L1 and L2. The transform of
round r is based on two Boolean functions f1,r and f2,r, having L1 and L2 as
their domain, correspondingly:
f1,r(L1) = L1[x1]⊕ L1[x2]⊕ (L1[x3] · L1[x4])⊕ (L1[x5] · IRr)⊕ κ1,r
f2,r(L2) = L2[y1]⊕ L2[y2]⊕ (L2[y3] · L2[y4])⊕ (L2[y5] · L2[y6])⊕ κ2,r,
where xi, yi are the numbers of active bit positions, IRr is the round constant
bit in round r, and κ1,r, κ2,r are the bits of the extended key deﬁned by the key
schedule for round r. The lengths of L1 and L2 as well as the bit positions xi,
yi are speciﬁc for each KTANTAN version.
Once f1,r and f2,r are computed, the registers L1 and L2 are shifted, the MSB
of each register falls oﬀ and the LSB is set to the output of f2,r and the output
of f1,r, respectively. KTANTAN32 applies transformations f1,r and f2,r once in
a round. One round of KTANTAN48 and KTANTAN64 updates the registers
using f1,r and f2,r two and three times, respectively.
Table 2. Version-speciﬁc parameters of KTANTAN
b |L1| |L2| x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6
32 13 19 12 7 8 5 3 18 7 12 10 8 3
48 19 29 18 12 15 7 6 28 19 21 13 15 6
64 25 39 24 15 20 11 9 38 25 33 21 14 9
Table 3. Round constant bits IRr: IR1 ﬁrst, IR254 last
1111111000 1101010101 1110110011 0010100100 0100011000 1111000010
0001010000 0111110011 1111010100 0101010011 0000110011 1011111011
1010010101 1010011100 1101100010 1110110111 1001011011 0101110010
0100110100 0111000100 1111010000 1110101100 0001011001 0000001101
1100000001 0010
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3.2 Key Schedule
The functions f1,r and f2,r require input from the key schedule, which is a
function mapping the 80-bit user-supplied key K = k79k78 . . . k1k0 to κ1,r and
κ2,r for each round r. It is exactly this part where KTANTAN diﬀers from
KATAN. This diﬀerence, together with some properties of the data transform,
makes KTANTAN vulnerable to our attack.
An 8-bit round counting LFSR is used to control the key schedule. It is deﬁned
by the feedback polynomial
ζ8 + ζ7 + ζ5 + ζ3 + 1
and its initial state is all ones. The value of IRr is speciﬁed as the most signiﬁcant
bit of this LFSR in round r. Let l7,rl6,r...l1,rl0,r denote the 8-bit state of the
LFSR in round r.
The key schedule of KTANTAN chooses two bits of K in each round. This is
done by applying two layers of MUX logic. First, K is divided into 5 chunks Wi
of 16 bits each: K = W4||W3||W2||W1||W0. One bit out of each chunk is selected:
ωi,r = MUX16to1(Wi, l7,rl6,rl5,rl4,r), i = 0, . . . , 4,
where the LFSR bits deﬁne the position in Wi to choose. Second, two out of
these ﬁve bits are chosen controlled by the other half of the LFSR state:
κ1,r = l3,r · l2,r · ω0,r ⊕ (l3,r ∨ l2,r) ·MUX4to1(ω4,rω3,rω2,rω1,r, l1,rl0,r)
κ2,r = l3,r · l2,r · ω4,r ⊕ (l3,r ∨ l2,r) ·MUX4to1(ω3,rω2,rω1,rω0,r, l1,rl0,r).
4 Low Data-Complexity Attacks on KTANTAN
In here, we apply the MITM framework described in Section 2 to all 3 variants of
the full KTANTAN with 254 rounds. The resulting attack requires an extremely
small number of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs (basically, the minimum due
to the unicity distance) and negligible memory. The MITM techniques make use
of the fact that several key bits remain unused by the KTANTAN key schedule
in large connected parts of the cipher. More precisely, it is the rounds at the
beginning and end of KTANTAN which we are most interested in to make the
attack work.
4.1 Related-Key Diﬀerentials of Probability 1
We start with a note on probability-1 related-key diﬀerentials of KTANTAN
over many rounds.
The key observation here is that if certain key bits are not used over many
rounds, they can be ﬂipped without aﬀecting the data transformation. In other
words, the R-round related-key diﬀerential (0, Δ) 	→ 0 holds with probability 1,
where 0 is the zero input and output diﬀerence in the data transformation and
Δ is the key diﬀerence with ones at key bit position not used in the R rounds
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Table 4. Related key diﬀerentials for KTANTANb, b ∈ {32, 48, 64}
covered #rounds diﬀerential probability
rounds
ϕ1,218 218 (0, 00000000800000000000) → 0 1
ϕ−181,254 174 (0, 00000000000000010000) → 0 1
(ﬁrst key bit positions are on the left-hand side). Some of the longest related-
key diﬀerentials of this type we found for KTANTANb are given in Table 4.
These diﬀerentials are due to the fact that the ﬁrst 218 and last 174 rounds of
KTANTAN do not use key bits k32 and k63, respectively.
We notice that it seems possible that these properties can be turned into
low-complexity diﬀerential related-key attacks on KTANTAN. However, we are
mostly concerned with attacks that do not require related keys, and hence con-
tinue by exploiting this property in another way.
4.2 Application of the MITM Framework to KTANTAN
Depending on the KTANTAN version, diﬀerent properties of the key schedule
are exploited in our attack. This is due to the fact that all three versions of
KTANTAN have diﬀerent numbers of register clocks in one round. The versions
with a larger block size have heavier rounds with more diﬀusion which compli-
cates the partial matching phase. Eﬀectively, this might reduce the number of
rounds in the middle for which matching is possible.
In Table 5 we give a summary of the properties and parameters of our attacks.
We aim for the full, and if this is not possible for the highest number of rounds.
Considering variants with a more reduced number of rounds would lead to more
neutrals key bits, and generally lower attack complexities.
To illustrate the meaning of this table, let us consider the ﬁrst entry. We attack
the full 254-round KTANTAN32. The two basic properties of the KTANTAN key
schedule which make our attack on KTANTAN32 possible can be formulated as:
Fact 1. ϕ1,α does not use key bits {k32, k39, k44, k61, k66, k75} for 1 ≤ α ≤ 111.
Fact 2. ϕ254−β+1,254 does not use key bits {k3, k20, k41, k47, k63, k74} for 1 ≤
β ≤ 131.
Table 5. Details of the proposed attacks
b R α A1 R− β A2 matching complexity Ccomp
bits m MITM key test total
32 254 111 32,39,44,61,66,75 131 3,20,41,47,63,74 8 75.000 72 75.170
48 254 111 32,39,44,61,66,75 131 3,20,41,47,63,74 10 75.000 70 75.044
64 254 123 32,44,61,66,75 131 3,20,41,47,63,74 47 75.584 33 75.584
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This means that if we ﬁx α = 111 and β = 131, then ϕ1,111 and ϕ123,254 will
have 6 neutral key bits in each direction. Moreover, one can eﬃciently match v
and u in 8 bits, despite being 21 rounds apart due to the slow diﬀusion in one
round of KTANTAN32, which is demonstrated in Subsection 4.3.
4.3 Partial-Matching Phase
In here, we describe in more detail the matching procedure that is used as a
sub-routine in the MITM stage.
Procedure. The starting point are two completely determined internal states
u and v several rounds apart (for KTANTAN32, one at round 111 and the other
one at round 131). If we considered a cipher where those middle rounds were cut
away, then the matching phase would be trivial as we would simply check if the
u = v. With a probability of about 2−b this check would give a false positive,
but overall the number of key candidates is reduced to about 280−b. Remember
that b ∈ {32, 48, 64}. Hence the number of key candidates is small enough to not
inﬂuence the attack complexity during the key testing state.
In order to bridge this gap and to obtain a result on the full cipher, we drop
the requirement to match on every state bit but allow for a much smaller number
of matched bits m. This will increase the number of false positives, but in a way
that does not noticeably inﬂuence any property of the attack. In more detail, we
ﬁnd that m bits (for KTANTAN32, m = 8) will still match with probability 1
(see below for details). This means that we will have reduced the number of key
candidates to 280−m after the MITM stage. In total, we hence need only between
2 (for block size b = {48, 64}) or 3 (for b = 32) known plaintext/ciphertext
pairs.
We note that this procedure can be implemented in an essentially memoryless
way, as every match can immediately be tested with another plaintext/ciphertext
pair. Also in our estimate of the attack complexity, we do not consider any
implementation optimizations that e.g. would also be possible for a brute force
search that does not use any shortcut attacks. Examples of such optimizations
would e.g. be a reuse of computations from one key guess to the next.
Details on the Partial Matching Phase. In the following we trace those bits
that remain unaﬀected during the middle rounds for the block size of b = 32. ’1’
means aﬀected, ’0’ means not aﬀected. k1 and k2 denote disturbances caused by
the unknown neutral bits from the opposite chunk at the respective rounds. For
other block sizes, we refer to Appendix A.
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10 bits match as follows
forward part:
forward R=111: k1=1, k2=1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=112: k1=0, k2=0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=113: k1=0, k2=0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=114: k1=0, k2=0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=115: k1=0, k2=0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=116: k1=0, k2=0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=117: k1=0, k2=0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=118: k1=0, k2=0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=119: k1=0, k2=0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=120: k1=0, k2=0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=121: k1=0, k2=0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=122: k1=0, k2=0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=123: k1=1, k2=0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=124: k1=0, k2=0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=125: k1=0, k2=0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
forward R=126: k1=0, k2=0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
forward R=127: k1=0, k2=1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
backward part:
backward R=131: k1=0, k2=1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
backward R=130: k1=1, k2=1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
backward R=129: k1=0, k2=0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
backward R=128: k1=0, k2=0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
backward R=127: k1=0, k2=0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
The highest number of matching bits is obtained at round 127:
forward R=127: k1=0, k2=1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
backward R=127: k1=0, k2=0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
As can be seen, at three positions in the state both in the forward and in
the backward part no changes happen, which is the property needed for the
matching part.
5 Discussion and Future Work
The recently proposed lightweight block cipher KTANTAN is susceptible to a
class of meet-in-the-middle attacks that seems to put less constraints on the
selection of key bits than some earlier meet-in-the-middle attacks on block ci-
phers. We proposed key-recovery attacks with an extremely low number of known
plaintexts. The approach we describe is inspired by recent advances in MITM
preimage attacks on hash functions like those that succeeded in breaking MD5
or Tiger [16,27], even though it remains an open problem to transfer most of
the techniques there from the key-less hash setting to the cipher setting. The
MITM approach may be seen as a way to turn very strong related-key properties
into attacks in the single-key setting, complementing e.g. the work on the self-
synchronized stream-cipher Moustique [21]. Even though the time complexity
of our attack remains high, optimizations may result in reduced time complex-
ities, by e.g. allowing the attacker to choose the plaintext instead (possible in
many protocols), or asking for more plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Also, implemen-
tation techniques that speed-up brute force search, such as determining a good
sequence of keys to guess and save computations that way, are likely to carry
over to the meet-in-the-middle attack.
Among the ciphers most vulnerable to the meet-in-the-middle attacks, are
those with little key-dependency in the sense that large parts of the cipher de-
pend on a subset of key bits only. This is opposed to substitution-permutation
networks which usually use subkeys of the block length in each round. For such
ciphers, it is often diﬃcult to mount a meet-in-the-middle attack even on a small
number of rounds because of the strong key dependency. However, this approach
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as a rule results in a much higher number of XOR-operations needed for the key
addition which in turn leads to higher area and/or time requirements and, thus,
to a lower eﬃciency. An optimal trade-oﬀ between the level of resistance and the
amount of key dependency remains, however, an area of research.
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A More Details on Partial Matching
A.1 Block Size 48 Bits
The details for the partial matching phase for the attack on KTANTAN with
b = 48 are as follows:
10 bits match as follows
forward part:
forward R=111: k1=1, k2=1 0000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000
forward R=112: k1=0, k2=0 1100000000000000000 11000000000000000000000000000
forward R=113: k1=0, k2=0 0011000000000000000 00110000000000000000000000000
forward R=114: k1=0, k2=0 0000110000000000000 00001100000000000000000000000
forward R=115: k1=0, k2=0 1000001100000000000 10000011000000000000000000000
forward R=116: k1=0, k2=0 0110000011000000000 11100000110000000000000000000
forward R=117: k1=0, k2=0 0001100000110000000 00111000001100000000000000000
forward R=118: k1=0, k2=0 0000011000001100000 10001110000011000000000000000
forward R=119: k1=0, k2=0 1100000110000011000 11100011100000110000000000000
forward R=120: k1=0, k2=0 1111000001100000110 11111000111000001100000000000
forward R=121: k1=0, k2=0 0011110000011000001 10111110001110000011000000000
forward R=122: k1=0, k2=0 1100111100000110000 11101111100011100000110000000
forward R=123: k1=1, k2=0 1111001111000001100 11111011111000111000001100000
backward part:
backward R=131: k1=0, k2=1 0000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000
backward R=130: k1=1, k2=1 0000000000000000000 00000110000011110011110000011
backward R=129: k1=0, k2=0 0000011100011011011 00011110001111111111110001111
backward R=128: k1=0, k2=0 0001110001101101100 01111000111111111111000111100
backward R=127: k1=0, k2=0 0111000110110110000 11100011111111111100011110000
backward R=126: k1=0, k2=0 1100011111011011011 10001111111111110001111000000
backward R=125: k1=0, k2=0 0001111101111111111 00111111111111110111110000011
backward R=124: k1=0, k2=0 0111110111111111100 11111111111111011111000001100
backward R=123: k1=0, k2=0 1111011111111111011 11111111111101111100000110000
The highest number of matching bits is obtained at round 123:
forward R=123: k1=1, k2=0 1111001111000001100 11111011111000111000001100000
backward R=123: k1=0, k2=0 1111011111111111011 11111111111101111100000110000
A.2 Block Size 64 Bits
The details for the partial matching phase for the attack on KTANTAN with
b = 64 are as follows:
47 bits match as follows
forward part:
forward R=123: k1=1, k2=0 0000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000
forward R=124: k1=0, k2=0 0000000000000000000000000 111000000000000000000000000000000000000
forward R=125: k1=0, k2=0 0000000000000000000000000 000111000000000000000000000000000000000
forward R=126: k1=0, k2=0 0000000000000000000000000 000000111000000000000000000000000000000
forward R=127: k1=0, k2=1 1100000000000000000000000 000000000111000000000000000000000000000
forward R=128: k1=0, k2=0 1111100000000000000000000 000000000000111000000000000000000000000
forward R=129: k1=0, k2=0 1111111100000000000000000 000000000000000111000000000000000000000
forward R=130: k1=0, k2=0 0001111111100000000000000 100000000000000000111000000000000000000
forward R=131: k1=0, k2=0 1100001111111100000000000 111100000000000000000111000000000000000
backward part:
backward R=131: k1=0, k2=1 0000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000
The highest number of matching bits is obtained at round 131:
forward R=131: k1=0, k2=0 1100001111111100000000000 111100000000000000000111000000000000000
backward R=131: k1=0, k2=1 0000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000
